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1 Introduction
There has been a renewed discussion of the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy: 
is there really an inflationary bias of monetary policy? Under which conditions are monetary 
policymakers constrained in their ’ cheating” of the public? The interaction between fiscal 
and monetary policy as well as the impact of the inflation-averseness of central banks (central 
bank conservatism) are important ingredients in this discussion. While relating to two recent 
articles published in the Journal of International Economics (JIE) this paper develops a 
political economy model of fiscal-monetary interdependence with two purposes. First, it 
argues that fiscal policy alone cannot avoid the inflationary bias of monetary policy, thereby 
disputing Dixit and Lambertini’s (JIE, 2003a) ’ symbiosis” result. Dixit and Lambertini 
claim that an inflationary bias cannot occur, if policymakers agree on their bliss points. 
Second, this paper contends that rent-seeking in fiscal policy can limit the inflationary bias, 
thereby complementing the discussion by Huang and Wei (JIE, 2006). They maintain that 
institutional quality (or petty corruption) affects the inflationary bias and determines the 
optimal degree of central bank conservatism.1
It all started with Kydland and Prescott’s (1977) seminal paper. They analyse the phe­
nomenon that policymakers may wish to deviate from pre-announced policies once private 
agents have based their decisions on policymakers’ promises. By reoptimising, policymak­
ers can benefit while exploiting private agents’ trust. If agents anticipate, the advantage 
is lost and both parties are trapped in a suboptimal outcome. This is called the policy 
time-inconsistency problem. It was already Kydland and Prescott (1977), who applied the 
time-inconsistency problem to monetary policy and the exploitation of the short-run Phillips 
curve. The argument is that an increase of pre-announced inflation (leading to reduced real 
wages) can be used to reduce unemployment below the natural rate of unemployment. Barro 
and Gordon (1983a and 1983b) developed this idea more explicitly in static and dynamic
1 Surprisingly, Huang and Wei (2006) do not even quote Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), even though both 
papers are based on Barro-Gordon (1983a) type models and discuss how to reduce or avoid the inflationary 
bias.
2
frameworks. They argue that a commitment device is required to prevent deviating poli­
cies, restore private agents’ trust in the policymaker, and thus ensure an optimal outcome. 
Rogoff (1985) posits that an independent, conservative (i.e. inflation averse) central bank 
can establish the reputation for non-inflationary monetary policy and thus act as such a 
commitment device.2
A major limitation of the aforementioned line of reasoning is that it ignores fiscal pol­
icy. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) argue that policymakers would not need to use time- 
inconsistent policies in order to achieve the desired level of unemployment, if taxes were 
non-distortionary and could be used to subsidise firms so that they can provide the de­
sired level of employment. Based on a Barro-Gordon (1983a) type model (including micro­
foundations) of distortionary taxation, they then show that the fiscal authority is made 
better off by having an independent [Rogoff(1985)-style conservative] central bank” . Using 
a similar model, Huang and Wei (2006) argue that Rogoff-conservatism is not necessarily 
a good thing. If government and central bank base their respective fiscal and monetary 
policy decisions on a similar loss function, central bank conservatism should be limited, if 
the institutional quality of the government is rather poor.3 In another Barro-Gordon type 
model, Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2004) go even further. They argue that the 
conflict between monetary and fiscal authorities increases when preferences become more 
divergent. This also implies a larger inflationary bias, the more conservative the central 
bank becomes. Unlike Alesina and Tabellini (1987), the two more recent papers describe 
circumstances in which a Rogoff(1985)-style conservative central banker is not necessarily 
helpful for reducing the inflationary bias.
2 Central bank conservatism can be achieved in various ways. First, central bank governors are penalised 
for inflation as proposed by Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1995). Their idea of optimal central 
banker contracts is developed, for instance, by Candel-Sanchez and Campoy-Miñarro (2004) and Chortareas 
and Miller (2004 and 2007). Second, inflation targets are imposed as suggested by Svensson (1997) and 
discussed by Beetsma and Jensen (1999). Third, in Fatum  (2006) conservatism results from central bank 
council decisions, if national delegates are strategically selected.
3 The intuition is tha t conservatism makes (expansionary) monetary policy painful. So, policymakers 
would normally avoid monetary policy. But poor institutional quality makes fiscal policy also painful. 
Therefore, society would be better off with less conservatism.
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Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) obtain quite a different result. They analyse policy interaction 
when there are a union-wide monetary authority and a multitude of fiscal policymakers 
(thus resembling the situation in Euroland). In their model, monetary and fiscal policy can 
become symbiotic, if policymakers agree on their bliss points, irrespective of disagreement 
on weights, non-coordination, order of moves, etc. Unlike all other papers, conservatism 
of the central banker does not m atter at all. In stark contrast to Alesina and Tabellini 
(1987) and all the others, they emphasise that the presence of fiscal policy variables alone 
eleminates the time-inconsistency problem.
Such a general result seems surprising and prompts me to comment on Dixit and Lambertini 
(Journal of International Economics 60, 2003a, pp. 235-247) in section 2 of this paper. In 
essence, the argument goes as follows. In their appendix, Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) 
develop a microfounded model, obtain the steady state, and derive some policy implications 
from perturbation results. Then they construct a macromodel based on the steady state 
results of their micromodel and derive far-reaching conclusions.4 By construction, fiscal 
policy in their macromodel is totally unconstrained and fiscal policymakers can always 
choose a costless, even beneficial, way to expand output. My critique of Dixit and Lambertini 
(2003a)5 is presented from two angles. First, their paper is criticised from a conceptual 
and economic point of view within section 2. While doing so, it is also pointed out that 
their symbiosis result is merely a special case of a general result by De Bruyne (1979), 
who proves that a non-cooperative equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, if there is no conflict of 
interest. Second, the argument of a missing cost for fiscal policy is taken up again at the 
end of section 4. The political economy model presented there can emulate the Dixit and
4 Dixit and Lambertini say: ”We interpret our results - ... - in a normative way. If the authorities’ 
preferences can be chosen in advance and can be made to coincide, the ideal inflation and output levels can 
be attained independently of the details of the institutions.” Such a general interpretation is astonishing 
since they realise (though only briefly mentioned on p. 239) tha t their results are only relevant close to the 
steady state.
5 Which is, however, not intended to diminish their other work on the inflationary bias and monetary 
and fiscal policy interaction, for instance Dixit and Lambertini (2001 and 2003b). In fact, in their (2003b) 
paper they do what they do not do here, i.e. assign a cost to fiscal policy by capturing the deadweight loss 
of fiscal policy in the social and fiscal authority’s loss functions.
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Lambertini (2003a) assumption as well as their result by restricting one of the section 4 
model parameters.
The basis for this discussion is laid in section 3, with an extension in section 4. Elements from 
some of the aforementioned papers are incorporated. The parsimonious model presented 
in section 3 does not require an (unrealistic) balanced budget constraint for each period. 
Fiscal policy is, nonetheless, constrained in that a budget deficit or surplus produces a loss 
for the policymaker. This is so because borrowing does not come free of charge. Similarly, 
a budget surplus would have allowed the government to spend more on public goods and, 
therefore, also carries a cost. In that regard the model is similar to, for instance, Demertzis, 
Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2004) or Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996). Since fiscal policy 
leading to an unbalanced budget is now costly, it is not surprising that the inflationary bias 
is back. Note, however, that we obtain this result -  in contrast to Alesina and Tabellini 
(1987) -  without introducing distortionary taxes.
Section 4 introduces and analyses the model extension. Similar to the spirit of Huang 
and Wei (2006), corruption (or, more generally, rent-seeking) is allowed. However, this is 
not modelled as an inefficiency in the tax collection process as in their paper. Instead, 
there is grand corruption: expropriation is an explicit objective of the policymaker. It is 
shown that this affects the time-inconsistency problem. Ironically, acknowledging that fiscal 
policymakers may try to ”cheat” the public (by expropriating wealth) results in monetary 
policymakers being constrained in their ”cheating” of the public (by reneging on a promise 
to the public). In this model, the inflationary bias is not eliminated due to the fiscal policy 
extension per se as claimed in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), but limited because authorities 
can also expropriate wealth. W ith just a small degree of grand corruption the inflationary 
bias of monetary policy is constrained, but can only be avoided altogether, if the central bank 
is extremely conservative. By restricting the expropriation parameter the model also allows 
us to emulate the Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) case: fiscal policy can be used costlessly to 
expand output. Then, as in Dixit and Lambertini, there is no conflict of interest between
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the monetary and the fiscal authority. Once again, we obtain the Dixit and Lambertini 
symbiosis result: the inflationary bias is gone. Section 5 concludes.
2 Som e C om m ents on D ix it and Lam bertini
Commenting on Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) requires to look at the way they combine an 
underlying micro model with a separate macro model used for obtaining their key result. 
The underlying model is their own version6 of Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) two-country 
general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition, the so-called redux model, which 
itself is based on Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). Within the model, they obtain pertur­
bation results around the steady state - as you would typically expect. Then, however, the 
log-linearised steady state conditions enter into a different model which also contains new 
objective functions for the authorities. This new macro model is the one that is used for 
analysing the time-inconsistency problem. Even though they note early in the text that 
”our analysis and its results can [only] be justified as long as the economy is not far from 
the steady state” , they draw far-reaching conclusions in the end: ” ... when they [the fiscal 
policy variables] are present the monetary policy can avoid the time-inconsistency prob­
lem.”7 Here, it is argued from both a conceptual and an economic point of view that their 
way of combining a micro and a macro model is problematic and explains their stunning 
result.
Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003a) underlying microfounded 2-country model contains indi­
vidual optimisation and a government that effectively maximises government consumption 
under a balanced budget constraint.8 The steady state output obtained is below optimal out­
6 Outlined in their appendix A which can be downloaded from Luisa Lam bertini’s webpage at 
http://ww w .clarem ontm ckenna.edu/econ/llam bertini/.
7 In their conclusion, they mention ’’special assumptions” for obtaining their results, but none of them 
refers to their main caveat, i.e. their way of combining results from separate micro and macro models.
8 Which is justified ’ without loss of generality” (according to Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995) because the 
model setup implies Ricardian Equivalence.
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put due to the distortions caused by monopolistic competition and, it can also be included, 
by distortionary taxation. Perturbation results around the steady state show that output 
(not individual utility though) could be increased under various fiscal policy measures, for 
instance: (i) paying production transfers raised by lump-sum taxes; or (ii) reducing dis­
tortionary taxation while lowering government consumption (thus observing the balanced 
budget constraint). Thus far their micro model. But how do they then use their micro 
model and its policy interpretation within their macro model? The ingredients of the macro 
model are simple: log-linearisations of the steady state conditions of the micro model and 
Barro-Gordon (1983a) type loss functions for the fiscal and monetary policymakers. Natural 
output could be seen -  they suggest -  as the (inefficient) steady state output determined in 
the micro model due to monopolistic competition. Authorities desire output above natural 
output, which is assumed to be identical for monetary and fiscal policymakers, but also for 
the representative agent according to Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003a) model assumptions. 
Aforementioned fiscal policy effects are encapsulated in the log-linearisations. They are 
exogenously given, either these fiscal policy effects are positive or they are negative. This 
means that any government can always choose its fiscal policy to be expansionary, either by 
altering its fiscal policy stance in one direction or the other. Irrespective of the magnitude 
of the expansion, there is no cost in any way, be it in terms of deficit finance, distortions or 
otherwise.
The description of Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003a) micro and macro models reveals several 
problems. First, objectives of private agents and policymakers in the two models are con­
tradictory. In the micro model private agents maximise utility and governments effectively 
maximise government consumption. The equilibrium levels for output and inflation are ob­
tained on that basis, but then they are used as input for the macro model. Here, however, it 
is suddenly desired levels of output and inflation, which form the new objectives of private 
agents, government and central bank. Second, the log-linearisations apply only close to the 
steady state. But Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) obtain as result that any desired level of
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output, no m atter how far away from natural output can be achieved through fiscal policy. 
Of course, they mention (and only just mention) that we must be near the steady state 
conditions, but then their claim that the presence of fiscal policy alone eliminates the time- 
inconsistency problem cannot be taken seriously. Third, let us consider the economic issues 
at stake for the two types of fiscal policy discussed by Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). As for 
the first type, can a government pay production transfers raised by lump-sum taxes?9 Yes, 
but the magnitude must obviously be limited. There is no excess burden associated with 
such taxes, but high levels of lump-sum taxes may affect agents’ ability to pay and thus 
influence their economic behaviour. However, in the Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003a) model 
such policy can be used without limit. As for the second type, what happens when the 
government reduces distortionary taxation while lowering government consumption (and, 
thereby, observing the balanced budget constraint)? Lower government consumption, be 
it public consumption or investment, affects private agents utility. So there would be an 
effect in the micro model with influence on the steady state conditions. The problem is that 
the log-linearised conditions in terms of inflation and output equations of the macro model 
should be changed. And results would, obviously, change as well.
Let us recall Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003a) claim: if monetary and fiscal authorities agree 
on the output and inflation bliss point, then fiscal policy alone suffices to avoid the time- 
inconsistency problem, irrespective of weights, non-coordination, order of moves, etc. This 
finding also implies that there in no need for Rogoff(1985)-type conservatism to alleviate 
the inflationary bias. Based on the discussion above it can be shown that their result 
hinges crucially on the assumption of costless fiscal policy. We proceed in three steps: (i) 
fiscal policy in Dixit and Lambertini (2003) is quasi unconstrained; (ii) the cooperative 
outcome must be Pareto-optimal due to their setup, and (iii) by construction, their non­
cooperative outcome must also be Pareto-optimal, which was already shown long ago by
9 In principle, this is Alesina and Tabellini’s (1987) argument: if fiscal policy (in their case, a fiscal 
subsidy) could be used unconstrained and costlessly, then the desired level of employment could be reached, 
thus eliminating the rationale for time-inconsistent monetary policies.
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de Bruyne (1976) in a more general setting. As for point (i), our key concern with Dixit 
and Lambertini (2003a) is that their macro model is based on the equilibrium obtained in 
the micro model. As a result, the macro model does not capture the distortionary nature 
of taxation appropriately. Government can always choose a costless way to expand output. 
Increasing distortionary effects and trade-offs between alternative instruments are ignored. 
Effectively, fiscal policy is made unconstrained. For instance, Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) 
model unlimited access to lump-sum taxes so that the government can achieve any level of 
output. This is in denial to Alesina and Tabellini’s (1987) insight, that it is the costlyness 
of fiscal policy which preserves the inflationary bias. Why do Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) 
model fiscal policy without constraint? That is not clear. The literature offers at least 
two ways of capturing restrictions for fiscal policy. A period budget constraint can be 
used - as done, for instance, in Huang and Wei (2006) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987).10 
The drawback is that budget deficits and thus intertemporal adjustments are totally ruled 
out. As an alternative, budget deficits (or more generally, an unbalanced budget) can be 
captured as a loss in the objective function - as done in Agell et al. (1996) or Demertzis et al. 
(2004).11 In another paper published in 2003, even Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) capture 
the deadweight loss of fiscal policy in the social and fiscal authority’s loss functions.12
In step (ii) we use the logic of the time-inconsistency literature to argue that the cooperative 
outcome is always Pareto-optimal because of how Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) set up their 
model. If monetary policy were the only instrument, then private agents would expect 
the central bank to renege on its promise because monetary authorities would be tempted 
to surprise agents and, thereby, achieve a higher level of output. Hence monetary policy
10 In Alesina and Tabellini (1987), there is a contemporaneous government budget constraint and the loss 
function includes the deviation from a desired level of public goods. As a result, there is an inflationary 
bias of monetary policy. In Huang and Wei (2006), too, the inflationary bias is always present, if we undo 
their extension to the Alesina-Tabellini (1987) model by setting their institutional quality param eter to 1 
(i.e. there is no longer a tax collection inefficiency).
11 The latter argue tha t this ’ implies a policy feedback rule tha t satisfies the long-run solvency and ’cash 
in advance’ constraints (Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba, 2001)” .
12 As a result, their (2003b) model is similar to  the ones used in sections 3 and 4 of this paper as well as 
in Demertzis et al. (2004).
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would have to validate private agents’ expectations of higher inflation in order to avoid 
an output reduction. With both monetary and fiscal policies available, private agents will 
rationally expect the authorities to try to achieve the desired output increase at lowest 
possible costs. In the Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) setup, fiscal policy can always be chosen 
to be expansionary to any degree and without costs or limitations to the fiscal policymaker. 
Under perfect coordination between both policymakers, private agents will expect costless 
fiscal policy, not costly monetary policy, to be used. As a result, desired output and desired 
inflation can be reached. Thus, given the assumptions of the model, the cooperative outcome 
must be the bliss point, which is also Pareto-optimal.
In step (iii) we would like to explain why any non-cooperative outcome is also Pareto- 
optimal in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). This is actually a long-standing result shown 
already by de Bruyne (1976).13 It suffices to quote his verbal summary of the technical 
analysis conducted in his paper: ” ... the non-cooperative equilibrium will be Pareto-optimal 
if and only if the cost functional of any player is not influenced, ..., by the controls pursued 
by the other players.” In other words, the non-cooperative equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, 
if there is no ”conflict of interest” between the players. Following Dixit and Lambertini’s 
(2003a) assumptions that policymakers agree on the bliss point and fiscal policy is quasi 
unconstrained, there is no conflict of interest between policymakers. Fiscal authorities can 
ensure the desired level of unemployment costlessly and will always do so, irrespective of non­
cooperation or the order of moves. Graphically, the reaction function of fiscal policymakers 
will always pass through the bliss point (which is also noted by Dixit and Lambertini, 
2003a). Knowing this the central bank can always achieve the optimal outcome by choosing 
zero inflation (i.e. not cheating the public). Hence a non-inflationary policy is also credible. 
As a result, the non-cooperative outcome must be at the bliss point given the setup in Dixit 
and Lambertini (2003a). This is Pareto-optimal and there is no inflationary bias.
13 His paper refers to a very general setting: intertemporal setting described by a system of difference 
equations, N players with intertemporal linear-quadratic loss functionals, n state and m control variables.
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3 A Parsim onious M onetary-Fiscal Interaction M odel
Unconstrained fiscal policy produced Dixit and Lambertini’s (2003a) symbiosis result and, 
in fact, lead to the absence of a conflict of interest between monetary and fiscal authorities. 
Properly accounting for fiscal policy means introducing some form of a constraint and, 
thereby, reestablishing the conflict of interest. The inflationary bias will be back, even if we 
strengthen the Dixit-Lambertini approach in two respects. First, we consider the interaction 
between the central bank and just one fiscal authority (instead of Dixit-Lambertini’s n fiscal 
authorities and their general matrix of spillover effects). We also give monetary and fiscal 
authorities identical loss functions, not just the same bliss points. However, fiscal policy will 
be constrained in our model by capturing deviations from a balanced budget as a loss in 
the loss function, similar to Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2004) and the other Dixit 
and Lambertini (2003b) paper. Note, however, that we obtain this result -  in contrast to 
Alesina and Tabellini (1987) -  without introducing distortionary taxes. The crucial issue is 
that fiscal policy is costly, not only because of the distortionary nature of taxation. On the 
basis of this parsimonious setup, we can then show in the next section that the inflationary 
bias is limited once we introduce grand corruption.
Here is the model. The government’s linear quadratic loss function is assumed to comprise 
the standard components, deviations of inflation n from desired (zero) inflation and of 
output y from desired (above trend) output (1 +  «)ÿ, but also a fiscal policy component 
(and expropriation in the next section):
L =  -  a n 2 +  -  6((1 +  «)ÿ — y)2 +  - (T  — G)2 with a > 0,9 > 0. (1)
The third term captures the loss incurred from missing the balanced budget target.14 T and
14 The formulation is similar to Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2004) as well as Dixit and Lambertini 
(2003b). (T — G) here, the difference between tax receipts and government spending, corresponds to t  and 
(T — G), if positive, corresponds to x in their models, respectively. A budget surplus carries a penalty due 
to presumed negative political implications. Not spending all the money means, for instance, providing less 
public goods, thereby affecting the government’s reelection chances. A budget deficit has negative effects
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G are specified separately in order to distinguish G from government expropriation (or grand 
corruption) E  which will be introduced in the next section. For simplicitly, we assume that 
G is exogenous and only T  can be changed by the government. (The opposite assumption, 
T  exogenous, does not change the findings.) O utput is determined by a modified short run 
expectations-augmented aggregate supply curve:
y =  y  +  0(n  — n e) — t (T  — G) with 0 >  0, 0 <  t  <  1. (2)
For simplicity, we consider an economy without shocks or tax  distortions. O utput y deviates 
from trend output y for two reasons: (i) surprise inflation (based on the standard argument 
th a t lower expected inflation produces expansionary real wage cost reductions); and (ii) 
fiscal policy (which is expansionary, if T  <  G). Coefficient t captures the crowding-out or 
crowding-in effect. This cannot be interpreted as a tax  distortion because (T — G) can be 
positive or negative. We consider a setup in which the central bank and the fiscal authority 
control a policy instrum ent each, inflation and tax  revenue, respectively. But they share the 
same aforementioned objective function (although the inflation objective is irrelevant for the 
fiscal authority and the balanced budget objective does not affect the m onetary authority). 
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium is derived from the two first order conditions for each 
of the three cases: (i) commitment [COM] (which, of course, implies th a t the central banks 
set n =  0); (ii) reneging [REN] (and thus cheating private agents who assume n e =  0); and 
(iii) the time-consistent equilibrium [TCE] (which requires th a t the central bank validates 
private agents’ rational inflation expectations, i.e. n =  n e). Here are the three equilibria:
C O M  n  rpC O M  ñ  t 9  i ri\
n = 0 1 =  G — 2a , i Ky (3)t 2 0 +  1
R E N  __ ___________ 09___________  -  rp R E N  __  ^  __________ aT9__________  -
a (T 2 0  +  1) +  0 29 G a (T 20  +  1) +  0 29 ( )
because it restrains the government’s possibilities in the future. As an alternative to the balanced budget 
proposition the model could equally be specified in terms of a desirable level of deficit -  without affecting 
the results.
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n TCE =  _________ 09_________  - t  TCE =  (G__________ aT9________ Ky (c)
a(T 20 +  1) +  0 29 — 09 a (T 20  +  1) +  0 29 — 09 y ( )
Comparing the three equilibria leads to the following ordering:
n TCE >  n REN > n CO M (6)
T TCE <  T REN <  G , (7)
T CO < T REN <  G- ,
T TCE <  (= ,> )  T CO M, if 0 <  (= ,> )1 . (8)
Most results confirm our intuition, but not all. The ranking of optimal inflation outcomes 
(equation 6) is as it would be in the situation without fiscal policy. However, changes 
in 0, the slope param eter of the Lucas supply hyperplane, affect n TCE and n REN (the two 
optimal inflation rates, which may vary) quite differently compared to the (two-dimensional) 
case without fiscal policy. In the standard Barro-Gordon (1983a) model, a flatter supply 
curve (higher 0) implies a higher TCE-equilibrium (though it does typically not lead to 
a higher inflation rate for the reneging equilibrium). Here, increasing 0 above a certain 
value actually produces a counterintuitive result. As the expansionary effect of a surprise 
inflation on output increases (higher 0, flatter supply hyperplane), the optimal inflation rate 
n TCE (as n REN) goes down, not up. At the same time, T t c e  (and T REN) increase, which 
means th a t expansionary fiscal policy is used less, not more as we might have expected as 
a compensation for the reduction in the use of m onetary policy.
Optimal fiscal policy is always expansionary (T <  G) because there is a benefit from stimu­
lated output (with its marginal benefit -  in the optimum -  being equal to the marginal loss 
from missing the balanced budget objective). This is a standard result in the literature.15
15 For instance, Agell, Calmfors and Jonsson (1996) and Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2004). 
Similar to this paper, they model centralised fiscal and monetary policy. By contrast, there is disagreement, 
if fiscal policy is decentralised. Aizenman and Isard (1993) claim tha t a monetary union with decentralised
13
Of course, the fiscal policy instrum ent is used in the COM case where the m onetary instru­
ment is not available (with inflation being constrained to 0) and in the TCE equilibrium 
where inflation corresponds to the rationally expected n e. In the REN case, we are more 
flexible and can use both  instruments. Graphically this means th a t we move on the supply 
hyperplane closer to the bliss point (where the curvature of the loss sphere is greater). Since 
we can use both  instrum ents to expand output in the REN scenario, it is optimal to use 
expansionary fiscal policy only to a lesser degree -  as shown by both equations in (7). The 
flatter the supply hyperplane (0 increases), the closer we get to the bliss point, ie. T REN 
goes up which means getting closer to the balanced budget. If output responded infinitely 
(0 ^  to), we would be on the bliss point, ie. T REN =  G.
But why does the ordering of T TCE and T COM change with variations in 0 (8)? If 0 were 
zero, i.e. no beneficial effect of a surprise inflation on output at all (the supply hyperplane 
would be vertical), all three equilibria would be at the same point. As 0 goes up, T COM 
increases, but only slightly, because the COM equilibrium is severely constrained.16 T TCE 
and T REN increase more significantly though, when the supply hyperplane becomes flatter 
(though there is a reduction of T TCE at first). It is optimal to use less and less expansionary 
fiscal policy, when the expansionary effect of a surprise inflation increases (0 up). This makes 
sense. The counterintuitive issue is only th a t the corresponding optimal inflation rate rises 
by less and less and then goes down as well. In other words, for a sufficiently flat supply 
hyperplane, both  m onetary and fiscal policy tu rn  less and less expansionary.
The key result here is, however, tha t the inflationary bias is always present (nTCE >  0) 
and increases with the desired output gap Ky. Authorities facing rational agents cannot
fiscal policy produces a budget deficit (and an inflationary bias), whereas Beetsma and Bovenberg (JIE, 
1998) argue tha t fiscal discipline may be achieved, if fiscal policy is decentralised and uncoordinated. The 
deficit issue is ignored in Huang and Wei (2006) and Alesina and Tabellini (1987).
16 The commitment equilibrium represents a point of tangency in the two-dimensional T  — y space between 
the authorities’ indifference curves (ignoring the n dimension) and the intersection of the supply hyperplane 
with the T  — y space. As the latter rotates slightly when the supply hyperplane becomes flatter, T COM 
increases.
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avoid being trapped in an inefficient equilibrium. Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) obtain their 
non-inflationary bias result under non-restrictive assumptions. In fact, they say th a t the 
“ideal [bliss point] is attained despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives, ... , 
w ithout fiscal coordination, ... .” Here we strengthen these assumptions even further: there is 
perfect fiscal coordination, i.e. only one fiscal authority; and m onetary and fiscal authorities 
are in perfect agreement about the weights for their objectives. We do, however, require tha t 
fiscal policy comes at a price. Under this more realistic assumption, the inflationary bias 
does not go away. Note, however, th a t central bank conservatism (increased a  in equation 
1) would reduce the inflationary bias in the model here.
4 P olitica l Econom y Extension: Grand C orruption and D ix it-  
Lam bertini (2003a) Once A gain
Allowing expropriation by the fiscal policymaker can be captured by changing the objective 
function as follows:
L =  2 a n 2 +  2 9((1 +  K)y — y)2 +  1 (T  — G — E  )2 — ÍE . (9)
The gain from expropriation relative to the other components depends upon exogenous 
coefficient Í  and is modelled linearly for simplicity. The th ird  term  of equation (9) must be 
changed as well because expropriation is like additional expenditures. We do not change 
output function (2), even though expropriated wealth may positively affect the economy to 
some degree. One could justify this simplification by assuming th a t the expropriated wealth 
is hoarded or taken abroad or used for buying im ported luxury goods.
We now obtain first order conditions with respect to three instruments, inflation n, taxation 
T , and expropriation E . The corresponding Hessian is still positive semi-definite, thus 
confirming th a t it is a well-defined minimisation problem. The Nash equilibria in the three
15
cases change dramatically:
C O M  nn =  U T COM =  G -  1 Ky +  A
T T 2U
E COM =  -  i  Ky +  - i -  +  ¿




T REN =  G - 1  Kÿ +  j L  +
T T2P T2a





ETCE =  - 1«y  +  +  « (12)
Let me begin with commenting the results for inflation in four respects. First, inflation 
outcomes can now be ranked as follows:
TCE REN COMn =  n >  n (13)
If the central bank can fool private agents and renege on its previous promise, it immediately 
achieves the time-consistent inflation rate. By itself, this does not imply th a t the result of 
the fully rational outcome (TCE) is now any better. Second, however, n TCE and n REN no 
longer depend on the desired output gap Ky. Inflation rates only depend on the weights 
of the loss function (9) and the coefficients of the supply function (2). This is good news 
and bad news. If the central bank tried to achieve a large output increase ( k >  0 and 
large), inflation would not be affected. However, even if the m onetary authorities did not 
want to exploit agents at all ( k =  0), there would still be an inflationary bias. In other 
words, no m atter how much the central bank wants to achieve by its cheating, inflation is 
not affected. Third, this result is produced by incorporating expropriation, but inflation 
rates are not affected by the weight expropriation receives in the loss function. (This is
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not surprising since expropriation is not a central bank instrum ent.) Fourth, as in the case 
without expropriation only central bank conservatism (increased a  in equation 9) could 
eliminate the inflationary bias.
The ranking of the three equilibria with respect to tax  outcomes changes as well:
TTCE <  TCOM _ t REN (14)
Optimal tax  revenues in the TCE equilibrium are now unambiguously smaller than  those 
in the commitment equilibrium. It is not clear, if any of those tax  equilibrium values are 
smaller (as in the case without expropriation) or larger than  government spending G. In 
other words, we cannot say, if fiscal policy is expansionary (T <  G) or not because of 
expropriation. W hat we know is th a t tax  revenue net of expropriation is always smaller 
than  government spending and all equilibria produce the same budget deficit:
T  -  E  < G (15)
T  -  G -  E  =  - 5  <  0 (16)
An interesting special case is 5 =  0. This means th a t the government can expropriate, 
but does not gain from it directly. The government does, however, use expropriation for 
balancing the budget and thus eliminate one of the sources for a loss in objective function (9). 
Looking at this special case from a different angle shows th a t this is exactly what happens 
in the Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) model (except tha t a suitably chosen deficit or surplus 
even has an additional beneficial effect on output in their model). For 5 =  0, the government 
optimally chooses a negative E  to balance the budget despite expansionary fiscal policy. Of 
course, this is not a realistic scenario, but it illustrates the case of a government, which can 
produce any budget deficit without incurring a loss. Not surprisingly, the inflationary bias 
is gone under these conditions.
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5 C onclusion
The question in the title is: can cheating policymakers prevent policymakers from cheating? 
This paper argues th a t cheating fiscal policymakers can have a significant impact on the 
cheating of m onetary policymakers. If we include grand corruption as an objective of fiscal 
authorities, the inflationary bias does no longer depend on the desired level of output, but 
only on the underlying weights and coefficients of the model. Modelling expropriation does 
not prevent the central bank from reneging on its promises, but the inflationary effect is 
limited. Furthermore, the outcome does not depend on whether (i) private agents are seen 
as rationally anticipating central bank behaviour (time-consistent equilibrium); or (ii) the 
central bank can renege on promised policies which the private sector actually believes 
(reneging equilibrium).
This paper implicitly argues th a t reducing the inflationary bias even further always requires 
a conservative central bank. This was suggested by Rogoff (1985) and others, but is not 
unambiguously supported by some of the recent papers incorporating fiscal policy, for in­
stance by Huang and Wei (2006) or by Demertzis, Hughes Hallett and Viegi (2004). All 
these papers show th a t fiscal policy affects the inflationary bias. But fiscal policy alone 
does certainly not suffice for eliminating the inflationary bias as suggested by Dixit and 
Lambertini (2003a). This paper shows th a t their ’’symbiosis” result could only be obtained 
because fiscal policy is totally unconstrained in their model. The model presented in section 
3 also shows th a t contrary to Alesina and Tabellini’s (1987) claim distortionary taxation 
is not required to obtain the standard inflationary bias result. It is the costlyness of fiscal 
policy, which produces the time-inconsistency problem when m onetary and fiscal policy are 
both  available.
There are two ways of thinking about the findings in this paper. First, suppose the model 
actually described reality. In particular, it can be argued th a t grand corruption is always 
present, at least to some degree, not just in developing countries, but even in advanced
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Western economies. Giving the model a positive interpretation we could then argue tha t 
the inflationary bias may not be as bad as feared. From a normative point of view, we are 
still stuck with a number of questions. Should we really try  to eradicate grand corruption? 
W hat are the welfare implications? Central bank conservatism may be helpful for reducing 
inflation under most circumstances, but is the effect on welfare positive or negative?
Secondly, the findings actually raise even more questions and suggest future research. Grand 
corruption may have an effect on the inflationary bias, but what happens, if we include tax 
distortions in our model. Similarly, what happens if we allow both for petty  corruption and 
for grand corruption. Huang and Wei (2006) argue tha t we may want to limit central bank 
conservatism when there are inefficiencies in the tax  collection process. All in all, there 
are still many open questions and numerous avenues for future research, especially those 
combining m onetary and fiscal policy with public choice arguments.
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